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Abstract
When we only have partial information about the probability distribution, i.e., when several diﬀerent probability distributions are consistent
with our knowledge, then it makes sense to select a distribution with the
largest entropy. In particular, when we only know that the quantity is
located within a certain interval – and we have no information about the
probability of diﬀerent values within this intervals – then it is reasonable
to assume that all these values are equally probable, i.e., that we have a
uniform distribution on this interval. The problem with this idea is that
if we apply it to the same quantity after a non-linear rescaling, we get a
diﬀerent (non-uniform) distribution in the original scale. In other words,
it seems that the results of applying the Maximum Entropy approach are
rather arbitrary: they depend on what exactly scale we apply them to.
In this paper, we show how to overcome this subjectivity: namely, we
propose to take into account that, due to measurement inaccuracy, we always have ﬁnitely many possible measurement results, and this ﬁniteness
makes the results of applying the Maximum Entropy approach uniquely
determined.

1

Maximum Entropy Approach and Its Limitations

Need to describe probabilities. One of the main objectives of science is
to predict future events based on the available information. In many practical
situations, it is not possible to uniquely predict the future events: there are
many factors which are diﬃcult to take into account. For example, while we
can predict tomorrow’s weather reasonably well, these predictions are not exact.
In such situations, when we know that for the same future quantity, several
diﬀerent values are possible, it is desirable to describe the frequency of diﬀerent
possible values, i.e., to describe the probability distribution on the set of all
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possible values.
Predictions are based on the known current and past values of diﬀerent
quantities. These values come from measurement and are also usually only
approximate. We usually know the range of possible values of the measurement
error, and we would like to know the probability of diﬀerent possible values of
this error; see, e.g., [5].
Often, we only have partial information about probabilities. In many
practical situations, we only have partial information about the probabilities.
For example, we may only know the range of possible values, but we have
no information about the probabilities of diﬀerent values within this range.
Sometimes, we know the ﬁrst moments of the probability distribution, but we
do not know its shape, etc.
In all these cases, there are several diﬀerent probability distributions which
are consistent with our knowledge.
It is often important to select a single probability distribution. According to the decision theory, a rational (consistent) decision makes should
select a decision with the largest value of the expected utility. If we know the
probabilities of diﬀerent outcomes, then this expected utility is with respect to
these probabilities; if we do not have full information about these probabilities,
this means that the decision of the rational decision maker corresponds to some
“subjective probability” distribution [1, 3, 4, 6].
So, to make a rational decision, out of all probability distributions which are
consistent with our knowledge, we must select a single one that will be used for
decision making. How can we select such a distribution?
How to select a single probability distribution: from Laplace’s Indeterminacy Principle to Maximum Entropy. To decide how to select a
single probability distribution let us start with the simplest case when we have
ﬁnitely many (n) alternatives, and we have no information about the probabilities of diﬀerent alternatives.
This situation does not change if we swap two alternatives i and j. Thus, it
makes to require that the selected probabilities pi and pj should also not change
after this swap, i.e., that we should have pi = pj . So, it is reasonable to select
probabilities for which pi = pj for all i and j, i.e., in which all n alternatives
have the exact same probability. Since these probabilities should add up to 1,
1
they must be equal to pi = .
n
This natural idea – that if we have no reason to assume that one of the
alternatives is more probable, then we assume that they are all equally probable
– is known as Laplace’s Indeterminacy Principle.
In the continuous case, a similar idea has been formalized as the Maximum
Entropy approach, according to which, out of all possible probability distributions with diﬀerent probability density functions ρ(x), we should select the one
∫
def
with the largest value of the entropy S = − ρ(x) · ln(ρ(x)) dx [2].
Maximum entropy approach: successes and limitations. The Maximum
2

Entropy approach has been successfully applied to many application areas; see,
e.g., [2].
However, this approach has a serious limitation. Let us illustrate it on the
example of velocity v. Let us assume that the only information that we know
about the velocity is that it is somewhere within the interval [v, v]. In this case,
the maximum entropy selects a uniform probability distribution on this interval,
1
with the probability density ρ(v) =
. So far, so good.
v−v
However, let us consider the same situation from a diﬀerent viewpoint. Sup1
pose that we are interested in the kinetic energy E = · m · v 2 . The fact that v
2
is between v and v means that the kinetic energy belongs to the interval [E, E],
1
1
where E = · m · (v)2 and E = · m · (v)2 . Since this is the only information
2
2
that we have about energy, it is reasonable to apply the Maximum Entropy approach and to conclude that energy E is uniformly distributed on this interval,
1
.
with probability density ρ(E) =
E−E
This also sounds reasonable, but the problem is that if the velocity v is
1
uniformly distributed, then the corresponding kinetic energy E =
· m · v2
2
is not uniformly
√ distributed. Indeed, for every E, the corresponding velocity is
2E
equal to v =
. Thus, the probability ρ(E)·∆E to have the energy between
m
√
2E
E and E + ∆E is equal to the probability to have velocity between
and
m
√
2E + ∆E
. Since the probability distribution on velocities is uniform, this
m
√
√
2E + ∆E
2E
probability is proportional to the width
−
of this velocity
m
m
interval. For small E, this
√ width is proportional to the derivative of the function
2
1
v(E), i.e., is equal to
· √ · ∆E. Thus, this probability – which is
m 2 E
√
1
1
1
equal to ρ(E) · ∆E – is equal to
·
· √ · ∆E and thus, ρ(E) =
v
−
v
2m
E
√
1
1
1
·
· √ . One can easily see that this is not a uniform distribution.
v−v
2m
E
So, if we apply the Maximum Entropy approach to velocities, we get a
uniform distribution on velocities, but not for kinetic energy. Similarly, if we
apply the Maximum Entropy approach to kinetic energy, we get a uniform
distribution on energy, but not on velocities. It start sounding as if Maximum
Entropy approach is subjective: its result changes depending on which of the
related quantities we apply it to.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we explain how to overcome the
above subjectivity.
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How to Eliminate Arbitrariness When Applying the Maximum Entropy Approach

Our main idea. The problem with the Maximum Entropy approach comes
from the fact that we assume that the corresponding quantity can take inﬁnitely
many possible values x – namely, all real numbers x from the corresponding
interval [x, x] can be possible values of this quantity. In the case when we only
have ﬁnitely many alternatives, there is no arbitrariness, the probabilities are
uniquely determined.
Good news is that the above assumption about inﬁnitely many possible
values is an approximation to the real-life situation – an approximation that is
intended to make our analysis easier. In real life, we do not observe inﬁnitely
many diﬀerent possible values of the quantity x: the only information that
we get comes from measurements; measurement results in a ﬁnite string of
symbols, there are only ﬁnitely many such strings, so there are only ﬁnitely
many measurement results.
We will show that if we take this ﬁniteness into account, then the above
arbitrariness disappears. Let us illustrate this idea on two examples.
First example: measurements with the same absolute measurement
error. Let us ﬁrst consider the case when all the measurements have the same
absolute measurement error ∆. In this case, once we know the measurement
result x
e, we can conclude that the actual (unknown) value of the corresponding
quantity x is within the interval [e
x − ∆, x
e + ∆].
If for two diﬀerent measurement results x
e1 and x
e2 , the corresponding intervals [e
x1 − ∆, x
e1 + ∆] and [e
x2 − ∆, x
e2 + ∆], this means that the measurement
results x
e1 and x
e2 may describe the same actual value of the corresponding quantity. Once the value x
e1 is ﬁxed, the smallest value x
e2 > x
e1 which is guaranteed
to describe a diﬀerent actual value x is the smallest value x
e2 > x
e1 for which the
corresponding intervals do not have a non-point intersection, i.e., the value for
which x
e2 − ∆ = x
e1 + ∆ and thus, for which x
e2 = x
e1 + 2∆. Similarly, we have
x
e3 = x
e2 + 2∆ = x
e1 + 2 · (2∆), and, in general, x
ek = x
e1 + (k − 1) · (2∆).
In accordance with Laplace’s Indeterminacy Principle, these values x
ek are
equally probable. In the limit ∆ → 0, we thus get a uniform distribution on the
original interval [x, x].
How does this solve our problem? At ﬁrst glance, we get the exact same
result – the uniform distribution. So how does this help us? It does help,
because this result is based on the assumption that all the measurement have
the same absolute measurement accuracy.
If the measurements of velocity have the same absolute measurement accuracy, then we get the uniform distribution for velocities. However, when
the widths of all the intervals [e
v − ∆, ve +[∆] are the same, for the energy
]
1
1
1
2
E = · m · v , the corresponding intervals
· m · (e
v − ∆)2 , · m · (e
v + ∆)2
2
2
2
have diﬀerent widths – meaning that the corresponding indirect measurements
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of energy have diﬀerent absolute errors. Thus, the above argument justifying
the unform distribution for velocity cannot be applied to energy, and we do
not make a confusing conclusion that the energy distribution should also be
uniform.
Vice versa, it is possible that all the measurements of kinetic energy have
the same absolute accuracy. In this case, the energy distribution is uniform,
but, in this case, the corresponding velocity interval widths are all diﬀerent –
and thus, we can no longer conclude that the velocity distribution is uniform.
Second example: measurements with the same relative measurement
error. Let us now consider another realistic case, when all the measurements
have the same relative measurement error δ. In this case, once we know the
measurement result x
e, we can conclude that the actual (unknown) value of the
corresponding quantity x is within the interval [e
x · (1 − δ), x
e · (1 + δ)].
If for two diﬀerent measurement results x
e1 and x
e2 , the corresponding intervals [e
x1 · (1 − δ), x
e1 · (1 + δ)] and [e
x2 · (1 − δ), x
e2 · (1 + δ)], this means
that the measurement results x
e1 and x
e2 may describe the same actual value
of the corresponding quantity. Once the value x
e1 is ﬁxed, the smallest value
x
e2 > x
e1 which describes a diﬀerent actual value is the smallest value for which
these intervals do not have a non-point intersection, i.e., the value for which
def 1 + δ
x
e2 · (1 − δ) = x
e1 · (1 + δ) and thus, for which x
e2 = x
e1 · q, where q =
.
1−δ
2
k−1
Similarly, we have x
e3 = q · x
e2 = q · x
e1 , and, in general, x
ek = q
·x
e1 .
def
Here, the values Xk = ln(e
xk ) satisfy the condition Xi = Xk + (k − 1) · ln(q).
In accordance with Laplace’s Indeterminacy Principle, the values x
ek (and thus,
the values Xk ) are equally probable. In the limit ∆ → 0, we thus get a uniform
distribution in the logarithm scale, on the interval [X, X], where X = ln(x) and
X = ln(x) — and thus, not a uniform distribution in the original x-scale.
Conclusion. We have just given two examples. Similar computations can be
repeated for more complex cases, e.g., when the measurement error consists of
an absolute and a relative error, i.e., when the corresponding interval of possible
values of x has the form [e
x · (1 − δ) − ∆, x
e · (1 + δ) + ∆]. In all these cases, our
discrete analysis leads to a unique Maximum Entropy-motivated distribution,
with no arbitrariness.
We can therefore conclude that, if we take the actual discreteness into account, then the Maximum Entropy approach is indeed not as arbitrary as it
may seem at ﬁrst glance.
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